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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") designated
entity policy has challenged the efficiency of the use of auctions to allo-
cate spectrum licenses. As an alternative to comparative hearings and
lotteries, auctions provide an effective solution to the costs, administra-
tive burdens, and delays associated with apportioning spectrum.
Congress required the FCC to allow firms to participate in the auctions
even if they had difficulty in obtaining financing. The FCC gave these
firms, known as "designated entities," set-asides and other preferences
to assist them in the competitive bidding process. In the broadband Per-
sonal Communications Services ("PCS") auctions, however, designated
entities frequently were unable to pay for their winning bids. Some of
these firms took advantage of programs offered by the FCC to help pay
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for their licenses, while others surrendered their licenses to the Com-
mission. Several firms also sought protection from the courts, which
resulted in litigation costs and delays. Most importantly, some licenses
sat dormant while these companies struggled to finance their bids, pre-
venting customers from benefiting from their use. These factors
combined to undermine the effectiveness of the auction process. Com-
missioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth claims the government's designated
entity policies "doomed these licenses to failure," calling these blocks
of licenses set aside for designated entities a "legacy of lost opportu-
nity."'
This article begins by explaining the history of FCC licensing
authority in Part I. Next, Part II reviews the FCC's implementation of
auction procedures and policies, including those for designated entities.
Part III discusses some of the problems encountered by bidders who
failed to pay for their winning bids at auctions, most notably NextWave.
Part IV examines attempts by the government and industry to resolve
the difficulties faced by these bidders. Lastly, Part V analyzes the
FCC's ultimate decision to cancel NextWave's licenses and to include
them in a reauction.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF WIRELESS LICENSING
A. Development of the FCC's Licensing Authority
The Radio Act of 1912 prohibited "the operation of a radio appa-
ratus without a license from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor."3
The Act limited the secretary's authority to "traffic control.' 4 The crea-
tion of the Federal Radio Commission in the Radio Act of 1927,5
however, greatly expanded the secretary's regulatory powers.6 The Ra-
dio Act of 1927 allowed the Federal Radio Commission to license
1. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Commissioner
Harold Furchtgott-Roth Reacts to NextWave Decision, at http:llwww.fcc.govlSpeeches/
FurchtgottRoth/Statements/2000/sthfr003.html (Jan. 12,2000).
2. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927).
3. J. Roger Wollenberg, Title III: The FCC as Arbiter of "The Public Interest, Con-
venience and Necessity," in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMNIMCATIONs ACT OF 1934
61, 62 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
4. Id. at 65; see generally Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
(holding that the secretary lacked discretion to refuse radio licenses); United States v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. nIl. 1926) (invalidating the secretary's attempt to issue
regulations limiting radio licenses).
5. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed by the Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064).
6. See Wollenberg, supra note 3, at 65.
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stations in furtherance of public convenience, interest or necessity.7 The
Federal Radio Commission used this standard to establish principles for
granting licenses."
The Communications Act of 19349 replaced the Federal Radio
Commission with the FCC. The FCC had essentially the same authority
to grant licenses under the "public convenience, interest, or necessity"
standard.'0 The FCC interpreted the public interest in terms of effi-
ciency" and used its licensing authority to determine the composition of
the "traffic" on the airwaves. Hence, the FCC's task was to select
which applicants would be granted licenses.
B. The Use of Comparative Hearings to Resolve
Competing Applications
In 1945, the Supreme Court examined the allocation of spectrum
among competing applicants. In Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, the
Court concluded that when two mutually exclusive applicants apply for
a license, they are entitled to a comparative hearing. 3 The Ashbacker
requirement of a comparative hearing provided license applicants a
quasi-judicial forum to explain why their application for a license better
served the public convenience, interest or necessity. 4
In practice, comparative hearings for wireless licenses proved to be
an imperfect and inefficient means of awarding licenses. The FCC de-
scribed this process as "often time consuming and resource intensive
from the perspective of both the applicants and the Commission."'' One
FCC commissioner even admonished comparative hearings as "the
FCC's equivalent of the Medieval trial by ordeal."'" The comparative
hearing process for the initial cellular licenses resulted in more than one
thousand applications, some containing more than one thousand pages
7. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 4,44 Stat. 1163.
S. See Wollenberg, supra note 3, at 67; see generally Great Lakes Broad. Co. v. Fed.
Radio Comm'n, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (holding that the public interest was vital due
to the scarcity of the airwaves).
9. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
10. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940).
11. Seeid. at138n. 2.
12. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
13. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 330 (1945). But cf. United States
v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956) (explaining that if an applicant does not meet
the FCC's threshold requirements it is not entitled to a hearing).
14. See FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 9601, 9608
(1997) [hereinafter Report to Congress].
15. Id.
16. Nicholas W. Allard, The New Spectrum Auction Law, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 13,
58 n. 40 (1993) (quoting dissenting statement of Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson, Cowles
Fla. Broad., Inc., 60 F.C.C.2d 372 (1976)).
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of detailed arguments and documentation. 7 Likewise, members of the
telecommunications industry encouraged switching from comparative
hearings to a procedure based upon random selection.'8 They expected
that a lottery system would reduce costs and provide a faster allocation
of licenses. 9
C. The Use of Lotteries to Efficiently Allocate Spectrum Provided Only
Marginal Improvement Over the Comparative Hearings
In 1981, Congress granted the FCC authority to use a system of ran-
dom selection, or lotteries, to award spectrum licenses under 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(i). 20 That same year, the FCC concluded that the public interest
would be served best with two competing cellular systems in each geo-
graphic area.2' Each geographic market was divided between the local
exchange service (e.g., one of the Bell operating companies) and a non-
wireline applicant.2 To resolve the heavy demand for cellular service
and to accommodate the numerous firms eager to provide it, the FCC
replaced the comparative hearing process with a hybrid comparative
"paper hearing" and lottery.'
The lottery system, however, proved to have its faults as well. Even
the Commission's minimal initial screening of applicants severely taxed
its resources.4 After the FCC assigned licenses through the lottery,
many went through a lengthy resale process as licensees looked for
windfall profits.6 This unwanted resale market and delayed service
again led Congress to attempt to reduce the administrative burdens26 on
17. See Report to Congress, supra note 14, at 9608-09.
18. See Amendment of the Commissions Rules To Allow the Selection from Among
Mutually Exclusive Competing Cellular Applications Using Random Selection or Lotteries
Instead of Comparative Hearings, Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 175, 5 (1983)
[hereinafter Report and Order].
19. See id. 4 (one cellular provider estimates a lottery will save between $160,000 and
$414,000 per applicant per market).
20. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1242, 95 Stat.
357, 736-37, amended by Communications Amendment Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259
§ 115, 96 Stat. 1087, 1094-95.
21. An Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for Cellular
Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 126 (1981).
22. Id. 1 29; see also Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551, 1556 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
23. Maxcell Telecom, 815 F.2d at 1554; see also Report and Order, supra note 18, 9.
24. See Report to Congress, supra note 14, at 9609.
25. See id.
26. Because the fee required to participate in a lottery was minimal, the deluge of
"speculators" applying for licenses presented a serious strain on FCC resources. This under-
mined one of the primary purposes of the lottery system-to reduce the FCC's
administrative burdens. The numerous applications also strained the industry's resources,
with an estimated $300 million spent on producing cellular applications for the lotteries. See
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the FCC and allow winning applicants to provide service to consumers
more expeditiously. 27
D. The Enactment of Competitive Bidding as a More
Efficient System than Lotteries
Congress revisited spectrum licensing with a focus on the use of
competitive bidding systems to address the problems of both compara-
tive hearings and lotteries.2 Congress believed competitive bidding
would correct the problems associated with the prior systems: the cost
of acquiring a license would dissuade speculation, the public (rather
than speculators) would receive value, and firms who most valued the
licenses would implement services quickly.29
The 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act3 amended the Com-
munications Act of 1934 to allow the use of competitive bidding" to
issue licenses and restrict the use of lotteries. The House Report noted
the problems of the lottery system33 and issued several findings sup-
porting an auction system for licensing spectrum.1  The auction
procedure was reserved for situations involving mutually exclusive ap-
plications for a license, where the "principal use" of the license is
determined by the FCC to be "in return for compensation from sub-
scribers. 35
Section 309(j)(3) set forth the requirements for the competitive
bidding system. 36 After determining which licenses are to be issued, the
FCC is required to establish, by regulation, the methodology of the
auction and eligibility to bid for those licenses. In doing so, the FCC
must "safeguard to protect the public interest., 3' When establishing the
id. at 9610 (citing EVAN R. KWvEREL & ALEX FELKER, USING AUCTIONS TO SELECT FCC
LICENSES (FCC Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 16, 1995)).
27. See Report to Congress, supra note 14, at 9609-10.
28. Id. at 9610.
29. Id. at 9610-11.
30. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002, 107 Stat.
312, 388-92.
31. The terms "competitive bidding system" and "auction" are used interchangeably in
this article.
32. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(5) (1994).
33. See supra Part ll.C.
34. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 253 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 580
[hereinafter House Report].
35. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, at 481 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088,
1170 [hereinafter Conference Report].
36. 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(3).
37. See id.
38. Id.
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auction methodology, the FCC must consider several objectives." These
include the original broad purposes listed in section 1 of the
Communications Act. ° The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993 also added four specific objectives:
(A) the development and rapid deployment of new technologies,
products, and services for the benefit of the public, includ-
ing those residing in rural areas, without administrative or
judicial delays;
(B) promoting economic opportunity and competition and en-
suring that new and innovative technologies are readily
accessible to the American people by avoiding excessive
concentration of licenses and by disseminating licenses
among a wide variety of applicants, including small busi-
nesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by
members of minority groups and women;
(C) recovery for the public of a portion of the value of the pub-
lic spectrum resource made available for commercial use
and avoidance of unjust enrichment through the methods
employed to award uses of that resource; and
(D) efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic spec-
trum.
41
The House Report explained the second objective in further detail.
First, the committee intended the FCC to use a common sense approach
39. See id.
40. 47 U.S.C. § I (repealed 1947).
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication
by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of
the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion,
national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges; for the
purpose of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and
property through the use of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of
securing a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority hereto-
fore granted by law to several agencies ....
Id.
41. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3002, 111 Stat. 251, 258
(1997) (adding a fifth objective to be considered in Section 3090)(3): "(E) ensure that, in
scheduling of any competitive bidding under this section, an adequate period is allowed-(i)
before issuance of bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction proce-
dures; and (ii) after issuance of bidding rules, to ensure that interested parties have a
sufficient time to develop business plans, assess market conditions, and evaluate the avail-
ability of equipment for the relevant services.").
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to avoid concentration of licenses, not any particular test.42 Rather, the
FCC should consider, for example, whether a single licensee dominates
any service or significant group of services." The committee's concern
in disseminating licenses among small businesses was to prevent a sig-
nificant increase in the concentration of the telecommunications
industries, while recognizing that "the characteristics of some services
are inherently national in scope, and therefore ill-suited for small busi-
ness." 44 The committee observed that those services with local
characteristics could "provide new opportunities for small business par-
ticipation. 45 In those cases, the committee anticipated that the FCC
would ensure that small businesses would not be excluded due to the
competitive bidding system.' Finally, the committee included minority
groups and women in order to ensure that such individuals would not be
excluded by the competitive bidding system.47 The Conference Report
added rural telephone companies to those Congress sought to protect
from exclusion due to competitive bidding.45
After setting the methodology for a particular competitive bidding
system, the FCC then must establish the requirements to participate pur-
suant to section 309(j)(4). Congress set forth five factors the FCC must
consider when prescribing its regulations for participation in an auction:
(A) consider alternative payment schedules and methods of cal-
culation, including lump sums or guaranteed installment
payments, with or without royalty payments, or other
schedules or methods that promote the objectives described
in paragraph (3)(B), and combinations of such schedules
and methods;
(B) include performance requirements, such as appropriate
deadlines and penalties for performance failures, to ensure
prompt delivery of service to rural areas, to prevent stock-
piling or warehousing of spectrum by licensees or
permittees, and to promote investment in and rapid deploy-
ment of new technologies and services;
(C) consistent with the public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity, the purposes of this chapter, and the characteristics of




46. See id. at 254-55, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 581-82.
47. See id. at 255, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 582.
48. See Conference Report, supra note 35, at 482, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1171.
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the proposed service, prescribe area designations and band-
width assignments that promote (i) an equitable distribution
of licenses and services among geographic areas, (ii) eco-
nomic opportunity for a wide variety of applicants,
including small businesses, rural telephone companies, and
businesses owned by members of minority groups and
women, and (iii) investment in and rapid deployment of
new technologies and services;
(D) ensure that small businesses, rural telephone companies,
and businesses owned by members of minority groups and
women are given the opportunity to participate in the provi-
sion of spectrum-based services, and, for such purposes,
consider the use of tax certificates, 49 bidding preferences,
and other procedures; and
(E) require such transfer disclosures and anti-trafficking re-
strictions and payment schedules as may be necessary to
prevent unjust enrichment as a result of the methods em-
ployed to issue licenses and permits.0
Subsection (4)(A), regarding alternative payment schedules, was
debated in the conference committee regarding the types of future pay-
ment structures that could be made available." The conference
committee sought to ensure that the Commission would not have to
evaluate bids and speculate on the amount of money that each would
generate, for fear of litigation and delay arising from such determina-
tions. 2
The intent of subsection (4)(B) was to prevent applicants from ac-
quiring licenses for purposes other than delivering a service to the
public. 3 For example, the House Report noted, "an incumbent service
provider could submit a bid for a license for a service that would com-
pete with an existing business, and engage in behavior that would
prevent competition from occurring" and delay service to the con-
sumer.
54
49. The use of tax certificates was eliminated by Pub. L. No. 104-7 (1995) (in favor of a
deduction for the health insurance costs of self-employed individuals instead).
50. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3002, 111 Stat. 251, 259
(1997).
51. See Conference Report, supra note 35, at 482-84, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1171-73.
52. See id. at 483, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1172.
53. See House Report, supra note 34, at 256, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 583.
54. Id.
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Finally, the conference committee amended subsection (4)(C) of the
House bill by adopting a Senate provision requiring the FCC to provide
opportunities to rural telephone companies in addition to small
businesses and businesses owned by minorities and women." This
amendment to subsection (4)(C) reflected the Senate's desire to
"establish at least one license per market as a 'rural program license' for
any service that will compete with telephone exchange service provided
by a qualified common carrier." The value of such a "rural program
license" would be set at an amount equal to comparable auctioned
licenses. 6
II. THE FCC's IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 3090)
Congress required the FCC to implement the new competitive bid-
ding system by March 8, 1994."' On October 22, 1993, the FCC issued
its Second Report and Order to auction PCS spectrum." Its purpose was
to foster new mobile services and technologies and to increase competi-
tion among PCS providers and between PCS providers and cellular
operators." The FCC acknowledged that these auctions would constitute
the largest auction in American history and expected to recover billions
of dollars for the United States Treasury, while introducing "an array of
new telecommunications products and services that are expected to fuel
our nation's economic growth and revolutionize the way in which
Americans communicate."'
As of September 30, 1997, the FCC had conducted fourteen auc-
tions and had awarded over 4,300 spectrum licenses.6 ' In its Report to
Congress on the effectiveness of spectrum auctions, the FCC declared
the auction process "a more efficient mechanism to assign spectrum in
cases of mutual exclusivity than any previously employed methods."'
The total amount of winning bids in these fourteen auctions was nearly
$23 billion dollars.63 Analysis of the broadband PCS auctions, however,
55. See Conference Report, supra note 35, at 482-84, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1171-73.
56. Id. at 483, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1172.
57. See Report to Congress, supra note 14, at 9611.
58. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communi-
cations Services, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700 (1993).
59. See id. 2.
60. Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bid-
ding, Fifth Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5532, 1(1994) [hereinafter Fifth Report and
Order].
61. Report to Congress, supra note 14, at 9611.
62. Id. at 9612.
63. See id. at 9613 tbl. 1.
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reveals some problems associated with the auction system and proce-
dures.
A. The FCC's Determination to Auction
Broadband PCS Licenses
The FCC adopted its first regulations to implement section 309(j)
on March 8, 1994.6' The Commission specifically selected broadband
PCS as appropriate for competitive bidding in the occurrence of mutu-
ally exclusive applications because the principal use of licensed PCS
spectrum was to be subscription-based for compensation.6
Broadband PCS falls within the class of mobile telephony known as
commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS"), which also includes cellu-
lar and specialized mobile radio ("SMR") service. 66 PCS systems differ
from these other services in that PCS formats are digital. Narrowband
PCS primarily has been used for paging and messaging services, while
broadband has been used for voice communications. 6 Broadband PCS
also is used for new wireless Internet services. 3
Cellular services are considered the "grand daddy" of CMRS.
69
There are several cellular providers in most markets and service extends
across the nation.70 As technology advanced, PCS provided higher qual-
ity and added features, such as voice mail, by utilizing digital
technology to condense frequency requirements. 71 In 1998, cellular still
dominated CMRS subscribership (estimated at 86%),72 but PCS gained
subscribers at the expense of cellular.73 Because cellular providers were
established, PCS providers were forced to deploy comparable coverage
in order to attract new customers.74 Although of better quality, PCS is
64. See Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive
Bidding, Second Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 2348 (1994) [hereinafter Second Report and
Order].
65. See id. at 2356-58 (also selecting Interactive Video Data Services and Common
Carrier and Commercial Radio Services as competitive bidding in the occurrence of mutually
exclusive applications).
66. See Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to
Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Fourth Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 10145, 10145 nn. 6-7,
10201 (1999) [hereinafter Annual Report].
67. See id. at 10174.
68. See id. at 10174 nn. 6-7.
69. Michele C. Farquhar & Lawrence J. Movshin, Developments in Wireless Telecom-
munications Policy and Regulation: A Review of the Past Year and Insights Into the Year
Ahead, 16 ANN. INST. ON TELECOMM. POL'Y & REG. 145, 149 (1998).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 150.
72. See Annual Report, supra note 66, at 10154.
73. See id. at 10173-74.
74. See id. at 10175.
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not as extensive as cellular geographically and is limited mainly to ma-
jor urban markets.75
B. FCC Implementation of the Competitive Bidding System for
Broadband PCS Spectrum Licenses
The FCC established extensive procedures and regulations for con-
ducting the broadband PCS auctions. 76 The FCC rules applied to all
bidders, with certain exceptions for designated entities. Generally, the
FCC considered procedural and policy concerns in establishing auction
rules. Procedural rules included the form of applications, upfront pay-
ments, down payments, lump sum payments, and defaults for winning
bidders.77 Separate procedural rules for designated entities included set-
asides, reduced upfront payments, bidding credits, reduced down pay-
ments, and installment payments for the remainder of the bid price.78
Other auction regulations focused on broader policy concerns such as
foreign ownership, collusion among bidders, and eligibility rules for
designated entities.79
The FCC established preferences for designated entities in further-
ance of section 309(j)(4), with the intent of assisting firms facing
obstacles (such as access to capital) in the telecommunications indus-
try.c The preferences were meant to allow entrepreneurs to participate
in the auction, resulting in increased services and competition.8'
1. Size of Spectrum and Geographic Coverage
The PCS spectrum to be auctioned was separated into six blocks:
three 30 MHz blocks and three 10 MHz blocks. The three 30 MHz
blocks would compete with cellular service, while the three 10 MHz
blocks would be used in a variety of ways including "niche services," or
as a complement to larger blocks of PCS or cellular service." The FCC
originally had set aside a 20 MHz block for the designated entities, but
reversed this "handicap" (compared to 30 MHz blocks) when the in-
75. See id.; see also Farquhar & Movshin, supra note 69, at 151.
76. See generally Second Report and Order, supra note 64; Fifth Report and Order, su-
pra note 60.
77. See generally Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 160-209.
78. See generally Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 58-87.
79. See generally Second Report and Order, supra note 64; Fifth Report and Order, su-
pra note 60.
80. See generally Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 230.
81. See id.
82. Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications
Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 4957, 12 (1994) [hereinafter PCS
Memorandum Opinion and Order].
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vestment community responded that financing "would be much more
difficult to obtain for the licensees on the 20 MHz block than on the
other blocks."83 Thus, Blocks A, B, and C would be 30 MHz, while
Blocks D, E, and F would be 10 MHz.8 Further, Blocks A and B would
be divided into 47 geographic regions, or Major Trading Areas
("MTA's"), plus Alaska and Puerto Rico, while Blocks C, D, E, F, and
G would be divided among 487 smaller Basic Trading Areas ("BTA's")
plus Puerto Rico." The FCC found that this would allow licensees "to
aggregate varying amounts of spectrum in different geographic areas
depending on their individual business plans," providing flexibility in
their service to consumers. 6
2. Provisions for Designated Entities
The FCC determined that setting aside certain blocks solely for bid-
ding by designated entities for each auction might be necessary to
ensure their opportunity to acquire licenses. 7 For the broadband PCS
auction, the FCC found that set-asides would be necessary for desig-
nated entities due to the ability of large competitors with extensive
financial capabilities to outbid those without sufficient access to capi-
tal.8 Blocks C and F were set aside as the "entrepreneurs' blocks." 9
The FCC established general procedures for its auctions in its Sec-
ond Report and Order, 90 modified in part by its Second Memorandum
Opinion and Order,9 and specific procedures for the broadband PCS
auction in its Fifth Report and Order.9 2 In establishing qualification
standards, the FCC noted it may require bidders' applications to include
"all information and documentation sufficient to demonstrate that the
application is not in violation of Commission rules .. ."" Prospective
bidders would be required to file short-form applications within the
83. Id. 57 (citing comments made by members of the investment community at an
April, 1994 FCC public forum on PCS rules).
84. Id. 17.
85. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communi-
cations Services, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 1% 56, 64,76-77 (1993).
86. PCS Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 82, 27.
87. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 245-47.
88. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 121.
89. Id.
90. See generally Second Report and Order, supra note 64.
91. See Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act--Competitive
Bidding, Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 7245 (1994) [hereinafter
Second Memorandum Opinion and Order].
92. See generally Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60.
93. Id. 59-60.
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stated filing period. 94 The FCC determined that short-form applications
and any applicable filing fees would reduce the administrative encum-
brances on bidders and the FCC and minimize the potential for delay.9
Short-form applications would include certifications "that the
applicant is legally, technically, financially and otherwise qualified ...
and in compliance with foreign ownership provisions ... and any other
service-specific qualification rules. 96 Designated entities would be
required to declare under penalty of perjury that they have met the
Commission's specific qualifications for such status." Applicants would
have to identify all partnerships, joint ventures, consortia, or other
arrangements for the licenses, including post-auction plans." Short-form
applications would not be held to a perfect-letter standard for minor
defects, but could not make "any major modifications to their
applications, including ownership changes or changes in the
identification of parties to bidding consortia."" After allowing minor
errors to be corrected, the FCC would accept the applications for
filingY °0
After filing short-form applications, bidders would be required to
submit an upfront payment, aimed at discouraging frivolous or deceitful
bidding.'0 ' In determining the amount of the upfront payments, the FCC
would balance its need to deter insincere bids with the goal of mini-
mizing the bidders' implementation costs.' °2 Because of the varying
nature of the different licenses to be auctioned, the FCC would set the
amount of the upfront payment on an auction-by-auction basis, requir-
ing bidders to pay a percentage of the expected population covered by a
94. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 164; Fifth Report and Order, supra
note 60, 1 164.
95. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 165 (noting that if only one applica-
tion is received within the time period, mutual exclusivity would be lacking and competitive
bidding would be inappropriate.); Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 62 (requiring
compliance with FCC "PCS-cellular and PCS-PCS cross-ownership limitations").
96. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 165-66.
97. See id. 166.
98. See id. Subsequently, the FCC decided to allow applicants to amend their short-form
applications to "provide bidders with flexibility to seek additional capital after applications
have been filed, while ensuring that the real party in interest does not change." Second
Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 91, .152. In response to concerns that "the
formation of reasonable and efficient alliances would be discouraged by the mandate to
expose the details of the alliance to competitors," the FCC allowed parties to "request confi-
dential treatment of competitively sensitive information." Id. 55-57.
99. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, $ 167.
100. See id. 168; Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 63-64.
101. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 171-88; Fifth Report and Order,
supra note 60, 65-71 (generally within two weeks of a scheduled auction).
102. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 171.
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license.' 3 The upfront payment would define the upper limit for bidding
within a round, while allowing participants to bid flexibly and change
strategy during the auction.0 4 Finally, the upfront payments would en-
sure that bid withdrawals or default penalties would be collectible.'5
The FCC reduced the amount of the upfront payment for designated en-
tities by twenty-five percent because of their lack of access to capital
combined with other expenses in the licensing process.' This upfront
payment amount was nonetheless deemed sufficient to deter insincere
bidding.""
Further, the FCC determined that bidding credits would be neces-
sary for designated entities due to the "extremely capital intensive
nature of broadband PCS."'0' The FCC originally established bidding
credits in three categories: small businesses, businesses owned by
women or minorities, and small businesses owned by women or mi-
norities." But before the FCC could conduct the broadband PCS
auction, the Supreme Court held that federal affirmative action pro-
grams must be narrowly tailored to further compelling government
interests. " ° As a result, the FCC voted to "eliminate all race- and gen-
der-based provisions from its C Block auction rules in order to reduce
legal uncertainties and prevent further delay of the auction,' thereby
making all small businesses eligible for a twenty-five percent bidding
credit."
2
The FCC determined that winning bidders must submit a down
payment of twenty percent of the bid price."' The remaining eighty
percent of the bid price would be due within five business days after the
FCC granted the license, with full payment as a condition."4 For
103. See id. 171-72.
104. See id. [ 172-73 n. 135.
105. See id. 176; Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 91, 125;
Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 65.
106. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 154-55.
107. See id. 155.
108. See id. 130-34.
109. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 130.
110. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (raising federal
preference programs to the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny standard).
111. See Commission Modifies "C Block" Auction Rules for Broadband PCS, Report
No. WT 95-12, available at 1995 WL 422112 (July 18, 1995).
112. See In re Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-
Competitive Bidding, Sixth Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R.. 136, 47 (1995) [hereinafter
Sixth Report and Order].
113. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 189-94 (explaining the FCC's
determination that a substantial down payment would ensure the bidders' financial capability
to deploy service quickly and protect against possible default, while not hindering their
growth); Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 72-74.
114. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 73.
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designated entities, the FCC determined it was fair to require a down
payment of only ten percent, thereby providing room for other post-
auction costs."5 Designated entities also were allowed to pay in
installments." 6 This installment plan gave designated entities a low
interest rate. They also had the opportunity to structure payments to
cover interest for the first six years and repay the remaining principal
and interest over the next four years.117
Finally, the FCC set substantial default penalties so potential bid-
ders would ensure that their qualifications and financial capabilities
would allow them to build their systems rapidly."8 Specifically, the FCC
sought to avoid any delays arising from litigation, disqualifications, or
reauctions."9 The rules for designated entities echoed this concern for
unqualified or defaulting bidders.'20 While the FCC sought to substan-
tially penalize withdrawn bids, defaulting bidders were penalized even
more, due to the difficulty of reauctioning defaulted bids. 2'
C. The Broadband PCS Auctions Result in Significantly Higher Bids
in the Designated Entity Set-Aside Blocks
1. A & B Block Auctions
The FCC conducted the first PCS auction between December 5,
1994 and March 13, 1995, awarding ninety-nine licenses in the A and B
Blocks.'22 This was the fourth spectrum auction conducted by the FCC
("Auction #4").' Two licenses were auctioned in each of the fifty-one
MTA's (with the exception of three "pioneer's preference" licenses be-
ing assigned) in 112 rounds of bidding over the course of ninety-eight
days. The licenses were won by eighteen bidders for $7.721 billion. Bid
prices are appraised by dividing the total amount of the bid by the
population within that bid's MTA. The average bid in the A and B
Blocks equaled between $15 to $16 per person in each market. To ac-
115. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 238; Fifth Report and Order, su-
pra note 60, 135-38.
116. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 1% 231-240; Second Memorandum
Opinion and Order; supra note 91, 127-28; Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60,
135-41; Sixth Report and Order, supra note 112, 11 39-40 (establishing all small busi-
nesses, not just those owned by minorities or women, as eligible for the most favorable
installment plan in the wake of the decision in Adarand).
117. See Sixth Report and Order, supra note 112, 39-40.
118. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 197.
119. Id.
120. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 75.
121. See id. 76.
122. See Annual Report, supra note 66, apps. A-2, A-4.
123. See id.
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count for the different amount of frequencies available in the A and B
Blocks (30 MHz) from the smaller Blocks (10 MHz), the valuation of a
license is quantified best by dollars per MHz per population, or "MHz-
Pops.' 24 The A and B Block licenses were therefore valued at
$0.52/MHz-Pops.'5
2. C Block Auction
The first C Block PCS auction ("Auction #5") was limited to desig-
nated entities. The auction began on December 18, 1995, lasting 184
rounds over the course of 140 days. For the 493 licenses bid upon, there
were eighty-nine winning bidders for a total of $10.071 billion.'26 After
adjusting for MHz-Pops, the licenses were valued at $1.33/MHZ-
Pops. 127 To date, not all of the licenses have been granted, but the one
hundred days it took for the A and B Block licenses to be granted has
been long surpassed.
3. C Block Reauction of Defaulted Licenses
After two winning bidders from Auction #5 failed to pay the re-
quired down payment on time, their licenses were reauctioned
("Auction #10") beginning on July 3, 1996. The reauction was again
limited to designated entities, lasted twenty-five rounds until July 16,
1996, and resulted in seven winning bidders for a total of $904 mil-
lion.'2 The licenses were valued at $1.94/MHz-Pops.' 29
4. D, E, & F Block Auctions
The auction for the D, E, and F Blocks ("Auction #11") was held
from August 26, 1996 to January 14, 1997." 0 Blocks D and E were open
to all qualified bidders, while Block F was limited to designated enti-
ties. "' The auction took 276 rounds of bidding, resulting in 125 winning
124. Id.; see also NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers.
Communications, Inc.), 235 B.R. 277, 284 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter NextWave
I .
125. See Annual Report, supra note 66, apps A-2, A-4.
126. See id.
127. See id. See also NextWave IV, 235 B.R. at 284.
128. See Annual Report, supra note 66, apps. A-2, A-4.
129. See id. See also NextWave IV, 235 B.R. at 284.
130. See Annual Report, supra note 66, apps. A-2, A-4. See also NextWave IV, 235
B.R. at 283.
131. See Annual Report, supra note 66, apps. A-2, A-4. See also NextWave IV, 235
B.R. at 282.
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bidders for a total of $2.517 billion.32 The licenses were valued at
$0.10/MHz-Pops.'33
5. C, D, E, & F Block Reauction of Defaulted Licenses
As a result of difficulties faced by many C and F Block winning
bidders, the FCC held another reauction ("Auction #22") between
March 23, 1999 and April 15, 1999. Auction #22 was necessary to
reauction 347 licenses, including those returned to the FCC due to de-
fault, disaggregation, or amnesty.'-" Auction #22 resulted in winning
bids for 302 licenses for a net total of approximately $413 million."'
III. INABILITY OF SOME DESIGNATED ENTITIES TO PAY
FOR LICENSES WON AT AUCTION
The FCC expected broadband PCS to be highly capital intensive,
"requiring bidders to expend tens of millions of dollars to acquire a li-
cense and construct a system even in the smaller broadband PCS
markets. ' 36 The primary obstacle to designated entities was their lack of
access to capital' 37 In its Report to Congress, the FCC noted several
PCS operators made capital expenditures exceeding one billion dollars
between 1995 and 1998.' The designated entity preferences were
meant to lessen the difficulties in acquiring sufficient capital to win li-
censes and build the service."'
Surprisingly, a handful of designated entities bid extremely high
prices for PCS licenses in major markets, even in comparison to the
large A and B Block bidders.' 4 Several C Block licensees subsequently
132. See Annual Report, supra note 66, apps. A-2, A-4.
133. See id.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 145-156.
135. See C, D, E, and F Block Broadband PCS License Auction Closes, Public Notice,
14 F.C.C.R. 6688, 6688 (1999).
136. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 60, 1 174.
137. See Annual Report, supra note 66, 96; Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620,
626 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
138. See Annual Report, supra note 66, app. B-17 (detailing cumulative capital expen-
ditures from 1995 to 1998 (e.g., Aerial, $1.024 billion; AT&T, $2.948 billion; Omnipoint (a
designated entity) $1.174 billion; Sprint PCS, $6.633 billion).
139. See Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 230. The FCC has since suspended
the use of installment payments for designated entities, while retaining bidding credits. See
Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules-Competitive Bidding Procedures, Third
Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 13 F.C.C.R. 374,
38-48 (1997).
140. Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Financing
For Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licensees, Second Report and Order and
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contacted the bureau seeking to modify their installment payments. 4'As
a result, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau suspended the in-
stallment payment deadlines for all C and F Block licensees in March,
1997,42 and a FCC task force was assembled to resolve proposed alter-
native payment schedules.' 43 Nearly a year later, the FCC ordered the C
and F Block licensees to resume their payments on March 31, 1998.
They also were required to pay a "suspension interest" over a two-year
period.' 44
To alleviate the licensees' burdens, the FCC allowed licensees to
disaggregate a portion of their license and surrender it to the Commis-
sion for reauction.45 Those choosing to return a portion of their licenses
were prohibited from selectively disaggregating spectrum within an
MTA (referred to as "cherry picking") in order "to facilitate attempts by
new bidders to aggregate spectrum and initiate service."'4 6 The FCC
then would reduce the amount owed by the licensee pro-rata based on
the amount of spectrum returned to the Commission.' 47 The licensee was
prohibited from bidding on the license in the reauction or from reac-
quiring that license through a secondary market transaction.1
8
Another option was amnesty. If a licensee chose this option, it
would have to surrender the license "in exchange for relief from its out-
standing debt" and the FCC would "waive any applicable default
payments."' 49 Amnesty also was intended to facilitate an expeditious
reauction. ' Finally, the licensees could opt for "prepayment," which
would allow the licensee to choose which licenses it wished to keep.'5'
Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 12 F.C.C.R. 16,436, 10 (1997) [hereinafter Fi-











151. Id. 64 (explaining that C Block licensees could prepay selective licenses subject
to restrictions and all other licenses were to be surrendered to the FCC in exchange for for-
giveness of the corresponding debt and any penalties).
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A. Some Designated Entities Turn to the Courts
to Retain Their Licenses
Rather than accepting one of the FCC's alternatives, several licen-
sees brought suits in order to retain their licenses, or at least to avoid
penalties for failing to comply with auction regulations.
In Mountain Solutions, Ltd., Inc. v. FCC, a winning bidder for ten C
Block PCS licenses made its first required down payment, but requested
a waiver due to its inability to make a timely second down payment.5
Within one month, the bidder reported that its financing issues had been
resolved successfully. 53 The FCC denied the waiver and the bidder
brought suit alleging the FCC's denial was arbitrary and capricious and
an abuse of discretion.5 4 The D.C. Circuit determined that the FCC's
response was not arbitrary and capricious nor was it an abuse of discre-
tion, despite the fact that it had granted similar waivers to other firms.'
Those situations were distinguished in that the firms did have financing
available on the date it was due, but missed the payment date inadver-
tently because of a miscalculation or administrative complications.' If
the bidder was not financially viable at the time the second down pay-
ment was due, it was in default. 57 The D.C. Circuit emphasized the fact
that the bidder's situation was distinguished from those who were
granted waivers and those who were later given the three alternative
payment options: that the bidder was in default once it missed its second
down payment.
Other winning bidders for C Block licenses also sought the protec-
tion of the courts after experiencing financial problems with their bids.
DCR PCS, a wholly owned subsidiary of Pocket Communications, Inc.,
won forty-three C Block PCS licenses. On March 31, 1997, DCR PCS
and Pocket filed voluntary petitions for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of
152. Mountain Solutions, Ltd. v. FCC, 197 F.3d 512, 514 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
153. Id. at 514-16.
154. Id. at 516-17; see also Mountain Solutions, Ltd., 13 F.C.C.R.. 21,983, $ 14 (1998)
(denying Mountain Solutions an emergency waiver of § 24.711 (a)(2) of the Commission's
Rules since there was no firm evidence that it had sufficient funding to make the second
payment at the time it was due); Public Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 16914, 16914 (Apr. 18, 1996)
(stating that the Commission's Rules on default payments will be strictly enforced).
155. See Mountain Solutions, 197 F.3d at 516-22.
156. Id. at 516 (denying Mountain Solutions a waiver of § 24.711(a)(2) of the Commis-
sion's Rules since the payment schedule was crucial to insuring the sincerity of the bidder
and preventing disruption to the auction process) (citing Mountain Solutions, Ltd., 12
F.C.C.R. 5904, 7 (1997)).
157. Id. at517-18.
158. Id. at 519.
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the Bankruptcy Code.5 9 The FCC agreed to a waiver in the interest of
settling the bankruptcy litigation to prevent the "tremendous expense
and potential delay in providing service to the public that continued liti-
gation causes."' 6
B. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. v. FCC
NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. ("NextWave") was at the
center of the most illuminating case of a designated entity seeking bank-
ruptcy court protection dup to financial difficulties after winning PCS
licenses. NextWave was formed in 1995 to build and operate PCS net-
works, providing third-generation wireless broadband Internet access
and digital voice services coast-to-coast primarily as a wholesaler.
6'
1. Bankruptcy Proceedings
NextWave won fifty-six C Block licenses at Auction #5 and seven
reauctioned C Block licenses at Auction #10. These bids totaled ap-
proximately $4.7 billion. 62 As required, NextWave made its five percent
down payment and submitted applications for the sixty-three licenses.
After NextWave submitted its applications, two rival bidders, Antigone
Communications, L.P. and PCS Devco, Inc., submitted petitions to deny
NextWave's applications. The FCC found that NextWave violated for-
eign ownership regulations, requiring NextWave to restructure. The
FCC conditionally granted approval for NextWave's licenses on Janu-
ary 3, 1997, subject to the restructuring. NextWave deposited its second
down payment on January 9, 1997, then executed a series of promissory
notes for the remainder owed for the licenses (90%) on February 19,
1997.63
On June 26, 1996, the FCC announced that Auction #11, for D, E,
and F Blocks, would commence on August 26, 1996.'64 The winning
bids for Auction #11 were a fraction of the C Block auctions, 6 which
159. See In re Pocket Communications, Inc., Waiver of C Block Option Election Re-
quirements, FCC 98-103, available at 1998 WL 278742 (1998).
160. See id. 9.
161. See NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., Company Information Overview,
available at http://www.nextwavetel.com/company/index.html (last visited September 4,
2000).
162. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers. Communi-
cations), 235 B.R. 272, 273 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter NextWave I1].
163. Id.
164. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers. Communi-
cations, Inc.), 235 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter NextlWave 1].
165. See Annual Report, supra note 66, at 10212 (valuations in terms of Pops: $1.33
and $1.94 for Auctions #5 and 10; $0.33 for Auction #11).
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allegedly devalued the C Block licenses.' 6 NextWave petitioned for
further reconsideration of the alternative payment plans established by
the FCC and later filed a petition for review of the FCC's alternatives in
the D.C. Circuit, which were both denied. The FCC and D.C. Circuit
also denied NextWave's request for a stay of the June 8, 1998 deadline
to elect one of the FCC's options.167
On June 8, 1998, NextWave sought protection under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, with claims of constructive fraudulent convey-
ance and "inequitable, unconscionable, and unfair conduct" by the
FCC.'6 The bankruptcy court found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(a) and (b):
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district
courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.169
The bankruptcy court further explained its jurisdiction for "core
proceedings" arising under Title 11:
(a) Each district court may provide that any or all cases under
title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred
to the bankruptcy judges for the district.
(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under
title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in a case under title 11, referred under subsection (a)
of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and judg-
ments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
166. NextWave 1, 235 B.R. at 267.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 267, 271.
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1998).
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(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances;
70
Therefore, the bankruptcy court found exclusive jurisdiction to ad-
minister the Bankruptcy Code and all claims, adversary proceedings,
and contested matters. The bankruptcy court further found that
NextWave's claims against the FCC were asserted in its capacity as a
creditor, not as a regulator, and that the FCC's regulatory power did not
affect its status vis-a-vis other creditors. 2 Finally, the bankruptcy court
found that nothing in the Communications Act "conflicts with a
fraudulent conveyance claim or manifests an intent to legislate with re-
spect to debtor-creditor relations or to authorize the FCC to dictate for
itself a preferred creditor status.'73
The bankruptcy court issued four subsequent decisions to resolve
NextWave's fraudulent conveyance claim. 74 The February 16, 1999 de-
cision found that NextWave's obligation was incurred on January 3,
1997, the date the FCC conditionally granted the licenses.' The May
12, 1999 decision found that the licenses did not represent their
"reasonably equivalent value," and instead found their fair market value
to be $908,146,000, thereby allowing NextWave to avoid
$3,720,437,000 (seventy-eight percent) of their bid.7 6 The June 16, 1999
decision held that NextWave's avoidance did not constitute a default,
thereby disallowing the FCC from canceling the licensees. 77 Finally, the




170. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1999).
171. NextWave I, 235 B.R. at 269 (holding that a federal agency, in its capacity as a
creditor, is subject to the Bankruptcy Code including the automatic stay) (citing NLRB v.
15th Ave. Iron Works, Inc., 964 F.2d 1336, 1337 (2d Cir. 1992)).
172. See NextWave 1, 235 B.R. at 269-70 (finding that the claim of fraudulent convey-
ance sought equitable remedies for avoidance for the benefit of other creditors and the debtor
under the Bankruptcy Code, implicating no regulatory conduct by the FCC).
173. Id. at 271.
174. The bankruptcy court dismissed NextWave's claim that the FCC should be equita-
bly subordinated to the claims of other creditors. Specifically, NextWave alleged the FCC's
failure to inform NextWave that it would commence Auction #11 before granting
NextWave's licenses, the devaluation of NextWave's licenses after Auction #11, and the
FCC's delay in granting NextWave's licenses constituted inequitable, unconscionable and
unfair conduct. The bankruptcy court held that it lacked jurisdiction over this claim because
the FCC's actions were within its regulatory capacity, made pursuant to its statutory author-
ity. See id. at 271-72.
175. Nart~lave II, 235 B.R. at 276.
176. NextWave IV, 235 B.R. at 304.
177. NextWave, 235 B.R. 314 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafterNextWave V1.
178. NextWave IV, 235 B.R. at 305.
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On July 27, 1999, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York upheld each of the bankruptcy court's five decisions.' 71 In
supporting the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, the district court found
that Congress "did not grant regulatory power to the FCC to make rules
or orders with respect to its own status as a creditor vis-a-vis its debtors
or other creditors of its debtors."'8 Furthermore, the district court found
that payment of the installment notes were "provisions of a contract
between a creditor and debtor ... subject to revision and adjustment
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, just as any similar debt."'"' Addition-
ally, the district court deemed the FCC's restructuring orders to be
"voluntary offers of a creditor to protect the solvency of the debtor in
order to ensure payment.' ' 2
2. NextWave's Bankruptcy Case on Appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The FCC appealed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy
court to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On November 24,
1999, the Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and
remanded the case for further proceedings.183 The Second Circuit issued
its opinion on December 22, 1999, holding that "the bankruptcy court
had no authority thus to interfere with the FCC's system for allocating
spectrum licenses .... 4
The Second Circuit noted the four-month gap between NextWave's
second deposit after winning the right to the licenses, the conditional
grant of the licenses, and the FCC's requirement that winning bidders
were required to submit long form applications to confirm that bidder's
compliance with FCC regulations and statutory requirements."' The
Second Circuit then focused on two arguments raised by the FCC: that
the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the
Communications Act preempted the fraudulent conveyance claim.'6
179. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re NextWave Pers. Communi-
cations), 241 B.R. 311, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter NextWave VI].
180. Id. at 315-16 (stating that the Communications Act precludes the FCC from col-
lecting revenue and that section 3090) "has no effect on the requirements, obligations, or
privileges of license holders").
181. Id. at 316.
182. Id. (relying on United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979), that
when the United States acts as a lender, it is substantially in the same position as a private
lender).
183. See FCC v. NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc. (In re NextWave Pers. Com-
munications, Inc.), 200 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1999) [hereinafter NextlWave VII].
184. Id.
185. Id. at 47.
186. Id. at49.
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The Second Circuit's opinion began, "The ... spectrum belongs to
no one. It is not property that the federal government can buy or sell."
Rather, the "spectrum is subject to strict governmental regulation."
1 7
The Second Circuit continued by examining the legislative history
of section 3090) to determine Congress' rationale in authorizing the
FCC to use auctions to license spectrum. 88 It found "the broader pur-
pose of [section] 3090) was to create an efficient regulatory regime
based on the congressional determination that competitive bidding is the
most effective way of allocating resources to their most productive us-
ers."' 9 Likewise, when the FCC implemented the auction authority, its
goal was to put the spectrum licenses in the hands of those who had the
ability "to introduce valuable new services and to deploy them quickly,
intensively, and efficiently" so as to "promote the development and
rapid deployment of new services in each area and the efficient and in-
tensive use of the spectrum."'
The Second Circuit then focused on the importance of full and
timely payment for the winning bids, noting the FCC's concern of deter-
ring "frivolous or insincere bidding."' 9' It determined the FCC's default
rules and penalties were important as a substitute for the various forms
of due diligence necessary to ensure "that the licenses would be
awarded to the appropriate entities."' Therefore, payment by install-
ments in full was made an explicit condition to retention of the
licenses.9
Next, the Second Circuit found that the FCC's alternatives offered
to those designated entities facing financial difficulties were "the FCC's
expert judgment as to the course that would best promote congressional
objectives and serve the public interest, thus manifest[ing] substantive
regulatory decisions about the allocation of spectrum."'9 4 Therefore, the
Second Circuit found that the FCC's auction system is "presumed to be
a regulatory tool for ensuring that licenses are distributed" to fulfill the
goals of the Communications Act and the licenses themselves are not to
187. Id. at 50.
188. Id. at 51-52.
189. NextlWave VII, 200 F.3d at 52 (noting that Congress chose the auction policy not
for maximization of revenue, but rather because it was the most "likely to promote the de-
velopment of new technologies and encourage efficient use of the spectrum, while
simultaneously recouping some of the value of the spectrum for the public").
190. Id., quoting Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 171.
191. Id., quoting Second Report and Order, supra note 64, 171.
192. Id. at53.
193. See id.
194. Id. (emphasis added).
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"be construed to create any right beyond the terms, conditions, and pe-
riods of the license."' 95
The history of the FCC's relationship with the courts then was ex-
amined,'96 revealing that it was "beyond the jurisdiction of a court in a
collateral proceeding to mandate that a licensee be allowed to keep its
license despite its failure to meet the conditions to which the license is
subject."'197 Furthermore, the Second Circuit held that "[w]hen the FCC
decides which entities are entitled to spectrum licenses under rules and
conditions it has promulgated, it therefore exercises the full extent of its
regulatory capacity."'' g Examined in this context, the Second Circuit
reasoned that the FCC had the authority to determine that "NextWave
was not the applicant most likely to use the Licenses efficiently for the
benefit of the public" and "in regulatory terms, that NextWave was not
entitled to the Licenses."' 99
Lastly, the Second Circuit disputed the bankruptcy and district
courts' treatment of the case as mere bankruptcy proceedings. The fact
that licenses are awarded according to market forces did not make the
FCC a mere creditor. Allowing NextWave to retain the licenses for
$1.023 billion when it had bid $4.70 billion impaired "the FCC's
method for selecting licensees by effectively awarding the Licenses to
an entity that the FCC determined was not entitled to them."20 ' Finding
that the bankruptcy and district courts had essentially exercised the
FCC's spectrum licensing function, the Second Circuit held that "they
were utterly without the power to order that NextWave be allowed to
retain them." 202 The court also disagreed with the bankruptcy court's
195. NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 53.
196. Id. at 53-54, quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168
(1968) ("Congress formulated a unified and comprehensive regulatory system"); Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 553 (1990) ("Congress assigned to the [FCC] ... exclu-
sive authority to grant licenses"); FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 136-37 (1940)
(that the Supreme Court is required to "enforce the spheres of authority which Congress has
given to the [FCC] and the courts, respectively, through its scheme for the regulation of'
radio transmissions); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942) (that the
division of authority between these "spheres" requires that "no court can grant an authoriza-
tion which the [FCC] has refused"); FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946) (holding
the FCC, not the courts "must be satisfied that the public interest will be served by ... the
licensee"); P & R Temner v. FCC, 743 F.2d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (that the FCC has
exclusive jurisdiction over granting licenses and placing conditions on their use).
197. See NextWave VII, 200 F.3d at 54.
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 54-55.
201. Id. at 55.
202. Id. (citing Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc., 316 U.S. at 14).
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determination that the FCC was acting as a creditor0 3 The Second Cir-
cuit concluded, "[i]n order for Congress' prescribed regulatory system
to function properly in a dynamic environment, the FCC's allocative
decisions must not be interfered with by other instrumentalities of the
federal government acting beyond their statutory authority."2 4 The
bankruptcy and district courts' decisions were reversed and the case was
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the circuit court's de-
cision.205
C. Legal Developments Since NextWave v. FCC
1. In re GWI PCS
GWI won fourteen licenses in the C Block auction, but in October
1997 opted for bankruptcy rather than the alternative payment plans of-
fered by the FCC.2 On June 4, 1998, the bankruptcy court voided
GWI's remaining payment obligations, approximately $894 million'7O
The bankruptcy court then proceeded to confirm a reorganization plan
for GWI consisting of two alternatives: continuing with the original ob-
jective of offering PCS service or returning the licenses to the FCC and
pursuing a return of their down payments.204
A stay was issued upon the bankruptcy court's orders while on ap-
peal to the District Court for the Northern District of Texas until
October 7, 1998.0' Shortly after the stay ended, GWI sought to have the
FCC's appeals dismissed because it had begun to effectuate the reor-
ganization plan. ° The district court accordingly held that the FCC's
appeals were "equitably moot" because the business reorganization plan
was "substantially consummated.,
21'
203. Id. at 55 n. 11 (stating that the bankruptcy court may not "adjudicate claims
against the FCC not as a creditor, but as an "allocator of licenses").
204. Id. at 55-56 (referring to Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. at 138).
205. For fraudulent conveyance purposes (since NextWave remained a debtor in bank-
ruptcy) the circuit court also determined, according to FCC regulations and auction law, that
NextWave's payment obligation arose no later than the announcement of their winning bid.
See id. at 56-60.
206. See In re GWI PCS, 230 F.3d 788, 793-94 (5th Cir. 2000). The parties in the case
included General Wireless, Inc., GWI PCS, Inc., and 14 subsidiaries, each holding one of the
C Block licenses. Because all the entities were consolidated in the case (and to avoid confu-
sion), they will be collectively referred to as "GWI PCS."
207. Id. at 795.
208. Id. at 796-97.
209. Id. at 798.
210. Id. (citing GWI's claim that the reorganization plan has having been "substantially
consummated" and listed numerous financial transactions).
211. Id. at 799.
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's decision on
three grounds. First, the Fifth Circuit held that the equitable mootness
determination was correct because the FCC had failed to maintain a stay
on the licenses, because the reorganization plan had been substantially
consummated, and because parties not before the court would be
adversely affected.2" Next, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "the
bankruptcy court possibly erred in permitting avoidance and enjoining
the FCC from revoking the subsidiary debtors' licenses for failing to
remit the full bid price, thereby taking onto itself a quasi-regulatory
function held by the FCC ... ."23 Despite this acknowledgment, the
Fifth Circuit upheld the equitable mootness claim, an issue that the
Second Circuit did not need to consider in NextWave2 14 Finally, the
Fifth Circuit held that the FCC was not entitled to deference because it
had not determined the obligation was incurred until after the
bankruptcy proceeding and disagreed with the NextWave decision
regarding the timing of obligation according to auction principles.1 5
This portion of the opinion appears to openly clash with that of the
Second Circuit in NextWave. This could present a split among the
circuits sufficient to draw the Supreme Court's attention, but may not be
considered an open divergence given the distinction over equitable
mootness.
2. In re Kansas Personal Communications Service
Kansas Personal Communications Service ("KPCS") was the win-
ning bidder for three C Block licenses, but the company experienced
difficulties meeting the payment requirements in early 1999."6 FCC
regulations allowed KPCS a grace period until July 30, 1999 before its
licenses would be cancelled, but on July 19, 1999, an involuntary peti-
tion for bankruptcy was filed against KPCS"' The bankruptcy court
concluded the automatic stay would protect KPCS's licenses from any
post-petition "act to exercise control over the Licenses, which are prop-
erty of the estate" and examined whether the default clause was an "act"
by the FCC.2 The FCC argued that the cancellation of the licenses did
not constitute an "act" because they were automatically cancelled, yet
212. In re GWI PCS, 230 F.3d 788, 800-803 (5th Cir. 2000).
213. Id. at 804 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 804-05.
215. Id. at 806-07.
216. See In re Kan. Pers. Communications Serv., 252 B.R. 179, 182-83 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 2000). KPCS had continued to make payments under the installment plan, but missed a
payment due date in early 1999. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 185-86.
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the bankruptcy court held that the FCC must "declare" a licensee to be
in default, thus constituting an affirmative act."9
On appeal, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas re-
viewed the bankruptcy court's interpretation of whether the cancellation
of a license is an automatic act or whether the FCC has discretion in the
cancellation of licenses.2" The court found the FCC's determination
"that licenses automatically cancel without any act" must be given
"controlling weight."22' Therefore, the court held that the automatic can-
cellation did not constitute an affirmative act by the FCC and, thus, "the
filing of the bankruptcy petition does not preserve a licensee's limited
property interest in a license."'2
IV. ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE DESIGNATED
ENTITIES' FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES
As detailed above, some licensees found litigation more attractive
than the FCC's disaggregation and amnesty alternatives. A negative ef-
fect of this litigation was the delay in competitive service to the
consumers. There were two major attempts to restore the licenses that
were held up in litigation: one by the government and one within the
industry.
A. FCC Requests Congress To Enact Legislation Prohibiting the
Bankruptcy Code From Interfering
With FCC's Licensing Authority
In order to clarify that high bidders could not seek bankruptcy
protection from their winning bid amounts, the FCC requested Congress
to pass legislation to prevent such evasion. The Senate fiscal year 2000
Commerce, Justice, State, and related agencies appropriations bill
included such a provision.' Congressman Dick Armey, the House
Majority Leader, however, was successful in keeping the provision out
of the corresponding House bill; thus, the provision did not emerge from
219. Id. at 185-87. The bankruptcy court held that "[il]icenses do not automatically
cancel unless the FCC decides to utilize that remedy." Id.
220. See United States v. Kan. Pers. Communications Serv., 256 B.R. 807, 810-11 (D.
Kan. 2000).
221. Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945)).
222. Id.
223. See Departments Of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year 2000, H.R. REP. 106-283, 128 (Aug. 2, 1999).
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the House-Senate conference committee in the final version of the bill.=4
Senator Judd Gregg, chairman of the U.S. Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary,
unsuccessfully implored the inclusion of the provision in the bill.2-5 At
a February 2000 Senate Budget Committee hearing, Senator Gregg
stated, "I am concerned whether the taxpayers are going to end up
holding the bag here .... The taxpayers own the spectrum and there is
no way the taxpayers should get shortchanged in this process. ' '26 His
comment suggests that Congress may revisit this issue. At this
hearing, then-Chairman William Kennard argued for legislation to
prohibit bankruptcy courts from modifying spectrum licenses.'
B. Large Firms Attempt to Acquire Licenses Originally Reserved
for Designated Entities to Expand Networks
Meanwhile, industry competitors sought to acquire these valuable
licenses for their own use. Nextel, the nation's largest Specialized Mo-
bile Radio operator, sought to purchase NextWave's licenses and
ultimately announced a hostile takeover bid valued at $8.3 billion."u
Nextel abandoned the takeover bid,229 but later sought to acquire these
licenses at the reauction.230
224. See Appropriators Determined to File Spending Plan Tonight, CONGRESS DAILY,
Nov. 16, 1996, available at 1999 WL 28417311 (citing Congressman Armey's support of
the bankruptcy court's decision); Peter S. Goodman, Who Gets Ainvaves When Good Sale
Goes Bad? Budget Negotiators Try to Resolve Issue, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 17, 1999, at
El, available at 1999 WL 23315289.
225. See 145 CONG. REc. S12899, S12902 (1999) (statement of Senator Judd Gregg),
available at 1999 WL 957926.
226. See Heather Forsgren Weaver, NextWave Loses In Court, Gets Skewered
By Senator, RCR RADIO COMMUNICATIONS REPORT, Feb. 14, 2000, available at
2000 WL 9540082.
227. See Testimony of FCC Chairman William Kennard, Senate Budget Committee
Hearing: February 10, 2000, available at http://www.senate.gov/-budget/republican/aboutl
hearing2000/kennard.htm.
228. See Nicole Harris, Nextel Reaches Pact With Government To Buy NextWave
Wireless Licenses, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1999, at B3 (explaining Nextel's acquisition would
collect significantly more than the amount proposed in NextWave's bankruptcy plan); Kathy
Chen and Nicole Harris, Nextel is Eager to Buy NextWave Radio Spectrum, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1, 1999, at B7 (noting the FCC's interest in freeing the spectrum and recovering a fair
amount of the licenses' worth); Nicole Harris, Nextel Communications to Launch $8.3 Bil-
lion Hostile Bid for NextWave, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1999, at B6.
229. See Nicole Harris, Nextel Withdraws Its $8.3 Billion Hostile Offer for NextWave,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1999, at B2 (noting that Nextel withdrew its bid when it realized it
may be able to acquire the licenses directly from the FCC).
230. See Petition For Expedited Rulemaking or, In the Alternative, Waiver of the
Commission's Rules, 15 F.C.C.R 2106, 2112 (2000) [hereinafter Nextel Petition]; Letter
from SBC Communications, Inc. to Magalie Salas, Secretary, FCC (Jan. 21, 2000)
[hereinafter SBC Petition], available at 2000 WL 96926.
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V. FCC's RESPONSE To SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION
A. Cancellation of NextWave's Licenses
Before the Second Circuit's decision, NextWave offered to pay the
remainder of its balance in full in order to retain the licenses. 2'
Following its victory on appeal, however, the FCC cancelled
NextWave's licenses for default and assigned them, along with other C
and F Block cancelled licenses, for reauction. 2 The bankruptcy court
found the FCC's action in canceling the licenses to be in violation of
bankruptcy law and voided the cancellation. 23' Within two weeks, the
Second Circuit again reversed the bankruptcy court.23 The FCC quickly
filed a writ of mandamus requesting the Second Circuit to order the
bankruptcy court to vacate its decision in order to enforce the Second
Circuit's December 22, 1999 decision and the FCC's cancellation of
NextWave's licenses.UI NextWave argued that this extraordinary
request would override the Bankruptcy Code. 6 The Second Circuit
granted the writ of mandamus, ordering the bankruptcy court to vacate
its order and to deny NextWave an automatic stay.23'
B. Reauction of NextWave's and Other PCS Licenses
The FCC reauctioned NextWave's cancelled licenses in an auction
ending January 26, 2001 for almost $17 billion.28 Licenses that were
formerly 30 MHz in size were reconfigured into three 10 MHz blocks. 29
The FCC also decided to retain set-aside blocks for designated entities
231. See In re NextWave Pers. Communications, Inc., 244 B.R. 253, 262 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2000) [hereinafter NextWave VIII].
232. See id. at 262-63.
233. See id. at 268.
234. See Appeals Court Again Backs FCC In Battle for Bankrupt's Licenses, CoMvslu-
NICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 11, 2000, at 1.
235. See Telephony, CONMMUNICATIONs DAILY, Feb. 24,2000, at 6-7.
236. See Telephony, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Mar. 1, 2000, at 10-11.
237. See In re FCC, 217 F.3d 125, 141 (2d Cir. 2000).
238. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, C and F Block Broadband
PCS Spectrum Auction Raises Nearly $17 Billion For U.S. Treasury (Jan. 26, 2001), avail-
able at http:lvww.fcc.govlBureausfWirelesslNewsReleases/2001/nrwlOlO4.html.
239. See Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Fi-
nancing for Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licenses, Sixth Report and Order and
Order on Reconsideration, 15 F.C.C.R. 16266, 14-15 (2000) (stating that 10 MHz li-
censes are likely to provide smaller or new applicants an opportunity to acquire a license that
may not be available if the licenses were 20 or 30 MHz, while allowing larger applicants to
aggregate these licenses).
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based upon a "tier" system according to population.40 This approach
intended to "make relatively more spectrum available for 'open' bidding
in the most populous markets where the demand for spectrum by exist-
ing CMRS carriers is the greatest and the prospects of a spectrum
shortage for these carriers is the most acute., 24' Under this system, non-
designated entities were able to participate in two of the three blocks in
tier one and one of the three blocks in tier two.242 Finally, designated
entities lost the use of bidding credits for set-aside blocks.2 43 While this
reauction brought in $10 billion more to the U.S. Treasury than the
original auction, it must be remembered that these licenses have been
inaccessible for consumers, and symbolize what Commissioner
Furchtgott-Roth termed a legacy of lost opportunity.
CONCLUSION
The FCC must structure future auctions to ensure that licenses are
allocated to those who value the licenses most and are most capable of
providing service to consumers. The FCC should lower upfront pay-
ments offered to designated entities. As discussed above, lower upfront
payments for designated entities were implemented due to obstacles in
accessing capital. The FCC, however, must consider other issues, in-
cluding: rapid deployment of services without administrative and
judicial delays, recovery of value for commercial use of the spectrum,
and efficient and intensive use of the spectrum. Upfront payments equal
to those for non-designated entities would further deter insincere or fi-
nancially deficient bidders.
The FCC should consider limiting designated entity set-asides to
less capital-intensive services, such as analog cellular, analog dispatch,
or fixed wireless. Congress realized that many small businesses would
be improper providers for services that are national in scope. Broadband
PCS is clearly a national service, with the largest industry members of-
fering coast-to-coast availability. Because the nature of the broadband
PCS industry demands large upfront capital, firms with difficulty in ac-
quiring capital may be simply unsuitable for acquiring and developing a
nationwide network.
240. See id. 18-19 (dividing each BTA into two tiers, with BTA's containing popu-
lations of greater than 2.5 million in tier one and BTA's with less than 2.5 million in tier
two).
241. See id. 19.
242. See id. 20 (removing the set-aside for all 15 MHz C Block licenses, F Block li-
censes, and any unsold 30 MHz C Block licenses from Auction #22).
243. See id. [44.
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The FCC should continue to open future auctions to all bidders.
Allowing non-designated entities to compete for the licenses dramati-
cally increases the likelihood that the licenses will be put into service
quickly. The FCC should replace its tier system with open auctions,
granting designated entities full use of bidding credits.
A more fundamental alternative would be to value winning bids in
proportion to the bidder's financial capability rather than by dollar
amount. For instance, if a small business' bid, in proportion to its reve-
nues, was larger than that of a highly capitalized company, such as
AT&T Wireless, the small business would win because it valued the
license more. This would allow the FCC to eliminate all discounts,
credits and tiers, and instead focus on which bidder "values" the license
the most in relation to its financial capacity. Still, a bid floor would be
necessary to ensure the bidder is able to deploy the service for consum-
ers.
To complement FCC changes in designated entity policy, Congress
should enact legislation to prohibit firms from seeking the sanctuary of
the bankruptcy courts with regard to the FCC's auction process. Such
legislation would prevent those firms that do not have sufficient fi-
nances from overbidding in order to win licenses. Allowing firms to use
this business strategy would frustrate the policy of the auction process
to disseminate licenses efficiently. If a bankruptcy court were to allow a
bidder to avoid a large portion of their bid, the purpose of distributing
licenses to those who value the licenses most is destroyed. Congress
certainly has major interests in protecting the treasury while maintaining
the efficient purposes of auctions. Such legislation would allow Con-
gress to maintain the fiscal health of the treasury, and indeed ensure an
influx of funds from future auctions, while promoting the sound market-
based principles of the auction system.
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